I. Introduction
This paper documents a robust stylized fact: the fall in trade caused by fi nancial crises is magnifi ed by the time-to-ship goods between the origin and the destination country. The paper is motivated by the collapse of world trade that occurred during the fi nancial crisis of 2008 and 2009 and the debates on why it was much larger than the fall in world GDP and demand. But we go further by analyzing the effect of fi nancial crises on trade using historical data. The amplifi cation effect of time-toship is very robust. It is observed at the bilateral level on a large panel of countries over the period 1950 to 2009 and at the fi rm level over the period 1995 to 2005. We argue that this stylized fact of fi nancial crises strongly suggests that they affect trade not only because they impact demand but also through fi nancial frictions, which are specifi c to international trade.
International trade differs from intranational trade in several dimensions. One on which we focus in this paper and that we can interpret as a fi nancial friction is time-to-ship. 1 It takes time to transport goods internationally, and we focus on how this fi nancial friction is exacerbated during a fi nancial crisis. For instance, a shipment takes more than 28 days to go from Rotterdam to Hong Kong, but a bit more than one day from Rotterdam to Copenhagen. This is without taking into account the time to load and unload the boat and the time taken by customs and other administrative procedures. Djankov, Freund, and Pham (2006) found in a sample of 180 countries that the median amount of time it takes from the moment the goods are ready to ship from the factory until the goods are loaded on a ship is 21 days. In "normal" circumstances, time to load, ship, and so forth implies a transport cost that depends on distance, the value, and the weight of the good transported. Of course even in normal times, there is an opportunity cost to time that can be measured broadly by the cost of capital. However, during a fi nancial crisis time-to-ship takes a new dimension: as time passes during which goods are stuck on cargo the probability that a fi nancial incident takes place in the destination country rises. We model this incident as the possibility that during a fi nancial crisis the importer defaults on his or her payment obligation. We present a simple partial equilibrium model in which heterogeneous exporters sell to distant importers. We show that in such a framework the negative impact on trade of the increased probability of default that comes with a fi nancial crisis is amplifi ed by the time it takes to ship the good. Crucially, time-to-ship does not in this case simply represent an extra cost, like transport costs do, it increases the elasticity of export volume to the expected cost of default. This is the core of the magnifi cation effect that time-to-ship produces. The reason is that exporters react to this increased probability of default by raising their export price and reducing their export volumes and values, the more so the longer the time of shipping. This can be thought of as a pricing-to-market strategy that depends on fi nancial conditions in the destination country. Hence, on the intensive margin, the value of imports by existing importers falls with a fi nancial crisis, and this is more so the longer the time to trade with the exporter country. We also show that in such a framework, the probability to exit and cease exporting is higher in a country that experiences a fi nancial crisis and that this effect is again amplifi ed by time-to-ship.
We test these fi rm-level predictions on fi rm-destination specifi c export data obtained from the French customs over the period 1995 to 2005. The fi rm-level data, in addition to the aggregate data, is consistent with predictions of the model and the role of time-to-ship. We fi nd that French exporters indeed raise their price and decrease their export volumes when the destination country is hit by a crisis. The reduction in volume and value is larger when time-to-ship is longer. Similarly, the probability that an exporter exits a given destination increases when the destination incurs a fi nancial crisis, and more so when time-to-ship is longer. Using aggregate data from 1950 to 2009, we fi nd that this magnifi cation effect is robust to alternative specifi cations, samples, and inclusion of additional controls, including distance. Both in fi rm level and aggregate regressions, when we include both the time-to-ship variable and distance, only the effect of time-to-ship remains signifi cant. This suggests that the mechanism that we uncover is indeed due to the role of time as a fi nancial friction.
There is a now large and still growing literature on the analysis of the trade collapse during the recent fi nancial crisis. Some papers have analyzed the characteristics of countries and sectors that were most hit by the fi nancial crisis. This is the case of Chor and Manova (2012) , who analyze the effect that credit conditions had on international trade during the recent global crisis by examining the evolution of monthly US imports over the November 2006 to October 2009 period, and compare trade patterns before and during the crisis. They identify the impact of credit conditions by exploiting the variation in the cost of external capital across countries and over time, as well as the variation in fi nancial vulnerability across sectors. They fi nd that during the crisis period, countries with tighter credit availability exported less to the United States, relative to other countries. Another related paper on the effect of credit constraints on export performance at the fi rm level is Amiti and Weinstein (2011) , who show that Japanese banks transmitted fi nancial shocks to exporters during the systemic crisis in Japan in the 1990s. Ahn, Amiti, and Weinstein (2011) review evidence that fi nancial factors may have resulted in a greater decline in exports than were predicted in models without fi nancial frictions. They show that export prices rose relative to domestic manufacturing prices across a large number of countries. This is consistent with a result we fi nd in a very different data set, which is that export prices rise when the destination country experiences a fi nancial crisis. They also fi nd that import and export prices of goods shipped by sea, which are likely to be affected most by trade fi nance contractions, rose disproportionately more than those shipped by air or land. Our paper is complementary to theirs in pushing the argument that what we document in this paper resemble footprints left by fi nancial friction shocks during a fi nancial crisis. In the same vein, Bricongne et al. (2012) fi nd that the exports of French fi rms in more external fi nance-dependent sectors were more adversely hit during the recent global crisis. However, some economists have downplayed the role of trade frictions and trade fi nance when explaining the drop in international trade. Levchenko, Lewis, and Tesar (2010) emphasize the disruption of global production lines and the reduction in trade in intermediate goods during the recent fi nancial crisis to explain that the fall in trade has been larger than the fall of output and therefore conclude that trade fi nance played a minor role in the trade collapse of 2008 and 2009. 2 Eaton et al. (2011) quantify the relative contributions of changes in demand versus changes in trade frictions, using a general equilibrium model of production and trade. They also conclude that the fall in demand was more important. Finally, we are not the fi rst to focus on time-to-ship to better understand trade patterns during fi nancial crises. In addition to Levchenko, Lewis, and Tesar (2010) already cited, Alessandria, Kaboski, and Midrigan (2010) , Ahn (2011 ), Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2011 , Leibovici and Waugh (2011) , and Kim and Shin (2012) present models with time-toship frictions. The fi rst shows that this introduction generates inventory adjustments that can explain the trade collapse during the latest fi nancial crisis. The mechanism we focus on that generates testable implications at both the aggregate and fi rm levels is, however, different as it does not rely on inventories. Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2011) and Antras and Foley (2011) present rich models with time-to-ship that endogenizes the choice of trade fi nancing in a situation where default risks exist both for exporters and importers.
The paper is organized as follows. We present, in the next section, a simple model of international trade with possible importer default, and we derive implications of the role of time-to-ship during fi nancial crises, at the fi rm and at the aggregate level. In Section III, using aggregate data on bilateral trade on the period 1950 to 2009, we show that the negative impact of a fi nancial crisis on trade is magnifi ed by timeto-ship between the two countries. Finally, in Section IV, using French exporter-level data we test the fi rm-level implications of the model. Section V concludes.
II. Model
We present a simple model where a fi nancial crisis generates a fall in imports that is more pronounced for country pairs with a longer shipping time. The aim of the model is to provide guidance for our empirical work and generate simple testable implications at the aggregate and at the fi rm levels. The model is in partial equilibrium and the fi nancial crisis is considered as an exogenous event. We leave for future research the aim of analyzing these issues in a general equilibrium framework. We focus on exporters in the Home country who export to many countries, each of them characterized by the number of periods s it takes to ship a good to the Home country.
3 Exporters differ in terms of productivity, φ, as in Melitz (2003) .
The model features a fi nancial friction in the form of an exogenous probability of default per period, which depends on the state of the economy. Each period, the probability that an importer of country s encounters a fi nancial diffi culty and defaults on his payments is q s . If the importer defaults, we assume for simplicity that the exporter is not paid for the goods he or she has shipped and loses the value of the shipment. 4 The probability that the payment due is effectively paid is therefore (1 -q s ) s . The probability that a default occurs during the shipping period increases with the length of shipping. The probability q s , which characterizes the fi nancial health of country s, is assumed to be higher during a fi nancial crisis.
5 Exporters are risk neutral fi rms in monopolistic competition markets and face a price elasticity of demand of σ in the markets they export to. They only use labor in production and have heterogeneous labor productivity φ. We can think of importers as wholesalers who then sell to consumers with Dixit-Stiglitz type of utility with love for variety. In this case, σ is the elasticity of substitution between varieties in the utility function of consumers. The exporter is paid when the goods are delivered. Hence, we do not take into account the possibility that the (risk neutral) exporter can buy insurance through trade fi nance and bank intermediation and we assume she uses open account terms. Importers can-but will not always choose to-use letters of credit issued by their banks (the issuing bank) as a means of assuring exporters that they will be paid.
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If the exporter submits the required documentation (invoices, bills of lading, etc.) to its bank (the advising or confi rming bank), payment is made to the exporter. However, letters of credit are expensive and require both confi dence and liquidity to provide fi nance and insurance about payment to the exporter. The confi rming bank may lack confidence in the issuing bank. Ronci (2004) indeed reports sharp falls of trade fi nance during the most important emerging markets fi nancial crises of the 1990s. During the 2008 to 2009 fi nancial crisis, the collapse of trade fi nance was also blamed for part of the trade collapse. Auboin (2009) reports an increase in 2008 in spreads on 90 days' letters of credit from 10 to 16 basis points in normal times to 250 to 500 basis points for letters issued by certain "risky" countries. A study by the IMF (2009) that surveyed several banks in developed and emerging markets reported a sharp increase in the cost of trade fi nance: 70% of the banks reported that the price for letters of credit had risen. In our model, if the cost of trade fi nance was to increase with the probability of default and a fi nancial crisis, our qualitative results would be similar: higher cost of trade fi nance during fi nancial crises would rise exponentially with the time-to-ship the goods and would translate in higher marginal costs and prices in the same manner as in the present model. A much richer model that endogeneizes the fi nancing mode of international trade as a function of default of both importers and exporters is provided by Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2011) and Antras and Foley (2011) , but this extension is beyond the scope of this paper. The exporter's problem is therefore to maximize the present value of profi ts of exporting to country s:
where the fi rst term is the value of sales discounted by the per period interest rate r and the probability of default of the importer. Variable w is the wage rate and w/φ the marginal cost of production. Variable F is a fi xed cost to export. These costs have to be paid before the export takes place. Profi t maximization generates the following optimal price and export quantities:
where Y s and P s are, respectively, the income of the country and the standard welfare-based price index that depends on prices of all locally produced and imported varieties. The fi rst two elements of the price equation (2) are the standard markup and marginal cost of the fi rm. The third element is specifi c to our setup and depends on time-toship. Because the probability of default increases with shipping time, the exporter will react by increasing its price and decreasing its export quantity for importers at longer shipping times. This is also the case because the opportunity cost of funds increases with shipping times and the interest rate. The latter represents the cost of borrowing, which can rise abruptly for fi rms during a fi nancial crisis. This specifi c prediction of the model (exporters charge higher export prices to destinations with higher shipping time) can be related to other models and empirical results (see Zhang 2012, or Martin 2010) who have found a similar result but with a different mechanism (additive transport costs, for example). Note that if importers differed by their fi nancial situation so that each importer had a different probability of default in a given country, the exporter would discriminate against less "trusted" importers (importers with lower capital, assets with lower value, a more vulnerable balance sheet, etc.) by a higher price and a lower exported quantity. This is what Antras and Foley (2011) fi nd in a recent study on poultry exports. Note also, that the reduction of trade, which comes from the decision of exporters to raise their price, comes on top of the standard demand effect (income Y s in the crisis country falls) and the possible effect on the price index P s , which could come with a sharp real depreciation, for example. A notable implication of our framework is that during fi nancial crises, fi rm-level export prices should increase whereas fi rm-level export volumes and values should fall: exporters discriminate against destinations hit by a fi nancial crisis because the expected marginal revenue falls in such destinations. This can be thought of as a pricing-to-market strategy that depends on fi nancial conditions in the destination country. Both effects on prices and volumes should be magnifi ed by longer shipping time s.
7 Crucially, time is by nature different from transaction costs such as transport costs (iceberg costs τ s in our framework) or asymmetric information. Time to ship does not simply reduce the expected revenues of trading overseas, it increases the elasticity of this expected loss to fi nancial risk.
Note that in these equations, the transport cost s , does not appear and therefore plays no role in the magnifi cation effect. Time to ship is, in interaction with fi nancial risk, of a different nature because it raises the elasticity of export volumes to change in fi nancial risk. This will be important in the empirical section, where we will want to distinguish between transport costs and time to ship. Note also that in the previous equations, we do not take into account the impact that the fi nancial crisis may have on export volumes through its effect on the price index and the income of the importing country. We will, however, be taking this effect into account when we go to the data. There is a threshold level of productivity φ, below which the exporter will decide not to export (i.e., when V s the present value of exporting to country s turns negative). We call this threshold for country s, s *. It can be shown that the effect of an increase in the probability of default on this threshold is given by:
Hence, by raising the probability of default, a fi nancial crisis pushes some lower productivity fi rms to exit. Again, this extensive margin effect is amplifi ed by shipping time.
We are interested in analyzing the impact of a fi nancial crisis that raises the overall probability of default of fi rms in the importer country, q s . It can potentially also increase the interest rate r if the fi nancial crisis (as in the case of 2008 to 2009) is a global crisis that raises the risk premium. Note that in our framework, the effect of an increase in the probability of default and of the interest rate have essentially the same qualitative impact.
The model also generates implications at the aggregate level. The value of the expected aggregate exports of the Home country to country s are given by:
where C s is a constant. Given the impact of a rise in q, which we interpret as a fi nancial crisis, the impact on exports to country s contains three terms:
where the last two terms refl ect the impact the crisis has on the income and the price index of the importer country. We assume that the net effect of these last two terms is negative. The fi rst term e s represents the impact of the fi nancial crisis on aggregate trade once the income and the price effects have been controlled for. Assuming a Pareto distribution for φ with k being the Pareto distribution parameter (an inverse measure of productivity heterogeneity) we obtain that:
The fi rst term in the fi rst equation is the impact of an increase in the probability of default on the intensive margin of exports and the second one is the impact on the extensive margin of exports. Hence, the theory predicts that, as for the fi rm-level results, an increased probabil-ity of default negatively affects aggregate exports and that this negative impact is amplifi ed by shipping time, through both the intensive and extensive margins. Several predictions of our model can therefore be tested. At the aggregate level, the negative impact of a fi nancial crisis on the imports of the country is amplifi ed by time-to-ship from the source country. Note also that a fi nancial crisis in the exporter country, if it raises the cost of funding for the exporter, has the same qualitative effect on trade as a fi nancial crisis in the importer country: an increase in r has the same impact as an increase in q. In particular, the impact of such funding stress on trade should be amplifi ed by time-to-ship.
There are also several predictions of our framework that can be tested using fi rm-level data. First, exporters raise their export price in countries hit by a fi nancial crisis and this is more so the higher time-to-ship to the country is affected by the fi nancial crisis (equation [4] ). Both the volume and the value of the exports at the fi rm level should decrease when the destination country is hit by a fi nancial crisis and this effect should be amplifi ed by shipping time to destination (equation [5] ). Finally, when a country is hit by a fi nancial crisis, the probability that some exporters cease to export to that country increases. Again, shipping time should amplify this increase in exit probability (equation [6] ). We now take these predictions to the data, starting with the aggregate implications.
III. Time-to-Ship and the Effect of Crises on Trade:
Country-Level Evidence
A. Empirical Methodology
We fi rst want to assess the effect of a banking crisis in a country on bilateral imports of this country, and how this effect varies with the time it takes to ship goods from each partner country. In this section we do this using aggregate trade data. A key issue is how to measure the time spent to trade goods internationally. A fi rst possibility is to proxy this by geodesic bilateral distance. A second possibility is to use estimates of the time needed to ship goods. This is certainly closer to the mechanism we want to highlight. It is, however, not perfect as country pairs do not transport all goods by sea. Some goods are transported by road and others by air. We will try to deal with this issue. But, not surprisingly, distance and time-to-ship are closely related and we will analyze how the results differ when we use either or both in the regressions. Our baseline estimation takes the form of a standard gravity equation:
where X ijt represents exports from country i to country j at year t, Y is GDP, and T ijt contains a set of time-varying bilateral controls, including FTA (Free Trade Agreement), currency union, and the real exchange rate. In most of the regressions, we include bilateral fi xed effects μ ij , so that time-invariant bilateral characteristics such as time-to-ship or geodesic distance, common language, contiguity, or colonial links are captured (although this specifi cation allows for interactions with the crises variable). A dummy variable, BC jt , takes the value of 1 if the destination country j experienced a banking crisis during year t, and ln d ij is the log of bilateral time-to-ship between countries i and j (demeaned such that ln d ij = 0 for the average value taken by time-to-ship in the sample). Finally, η t represent year dummies and ε ijt the error term. Our coeffi cients of interest are γ 1 and γ 2 . The fi rst is expected to be negative: a banking crisis decreases imports (even after controlling for demand). We will see that γ 2 is also estimated to be negative: the negative effect of banking crises in the destination country is magnifi ed by bilateral time-to-ship.
A diffi culty when estimating this specifi cation is that it omits the ideal price indexes (or multilateral resistance [MR] indexes, using Anderson and Van Wincoop [2003] celebrated terminology). The inclusion of bilateral fi xed effects μ ij only partly solves the problem, as these MR indexes may vary over time, especially during fi nancial crises. We will, therefore, check the robustness of our results to the inclusion of importer and exporter × year dummies. The inclusion of importer × year dummies controls for the importer price index that varies over time. It prevents from estimating γ 1 , but our main coeffi cient of interest, γ 2 , can still be identifi ed. Finally, in all estimations standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the destination × year level. 
B. Data
The trade data come from the International Monetary Fund's Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS).
9 It covers the 1950 to 2009 period, which is of crucial importance, since this includes the recent fi nancial crisis, as well as past crisis episodes. While DOTS lacks data on trade for individual goods, it is the only data set containing a panel of worldwide bilateral trade that goes back far enough to offer a good match with the Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) data set on fi nancial crises dates from 1800 to 2010. Our fi nal data set includes 185 exporting countries and 69 importing countries from 1950 to 2009. Table A1 in the appendix lists the countries in our sample and indicates the countries covered in the Reinhart and Rogoff data set. The lower number of importing countries is due to the availability of the fi nancial crises data. Controlling for the occurrence of crises in the exporting country results in a signifi cant loss of information, but leaves our results unchanged, as we will show later. For fi nancial crises, we follow the literature and focus on banking crises (and check the robustness of our results with currency crises). According to Reinhart and Rogoff (2011, 1680) , a banking crisis is marked by two types of events: "(1) bank runs that lead to the closure, merging, or takeover by the public sector of one or more fi nancial institutions; and (2) if there are no runs, the closure, merging, takeover, or large-scale government assistance of an important fi nancial institution (or group of institutions), that marks the start of a string of similar outcomes for other fi nancial institutions." Reinhart and Rogoff 's data set combines various sources. Our fi nal data set contains around a hundred of these events, which include both severe and systemic banking crises in their classifi cation. The appendix depicts other important characteristics of our data set: the frequency of country pairs with a banking crises in the destination country is plotted in fi gure A1, the starting dates of the crises are shown in table A2, and the mean differences in covariates with and without banking crises are reported in table A4.
GDPs come from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI). Since WDI starts in 1960 and does not contain information for some countries (e.g., Taiwan or Russia before 1989), we complement WDI with estimates provided by Angus Maddison. 10 The data on FTAs are mainly constructed from three main sources: (a) table 3 in Baier and Bergstrand (2007) ; (b) the World Trade Organization (WTO) website; 11 and (c) qualitative information contained in Frankel (1997) . The data on currency unions (CU) are an updated and extended version of the list provided by Glick and Rose (2002) . 12 Bilateral real exchange rate is computed based on Penn World Table 7 .0 (Heston, Summers, and Aten 2011) . Bilateral distance is calculated as the population-weighted great circle (geodesic) distance between the largest cities of the two countries and come from the CEPII distance database, as well as common (offi cial) language, contiguity, common colonizer, and colonial relationships.
We use the data of Feyrer (2011) on time-to-ship to get a measure of the time it takes to trade between countries. The time required to travel from any oceanic point to each of its trading partners is calculated by Feyrer (2011) using very detailed geographic data to reconstruct shortest shipping routes, and assuming a speed of 20 knots. Feyrer's data set covers 130 out of our 185 exporting countries and 59 out of our 69 importing countries. Thus, to avoid losing information on fi nancial crises, we expand and amend his data set. Not surprisingly, the correlation between Feyrer's time-to-ship estimate and geodesic bilateral distance is high (.88). Not surprisingly either, the largest deviations are for contiguous countries. For those pairs of countries, we replace the time-toship value by the "time-to-road" based on the geodesic distance and assumed a speed of 60 knots.
14 Feyrer's sample also excludes landlocked countries and other countries such as Belgium. To recover bilateral information for those countries, we identifi ed their closest primary port. 15 Then, for each landlocked country, we computed a time-to-road to that port and added the time-to-ship for each given destination. In robustness checks, we also run regressions using the simple geodesic distance as a proxy for the time it takes to trade between two countries, as well as the original Feyrer's time-to-ship.
Finally, we will also check the robustness of our results to the inclusion of fi nancial development, proxied by the ratio of private credit over GDP from the WDI between 1960 and 2009.
C. Results
Baseline results. We want to study whether the fall in trade caused by a fi nancial crisis in the destination country is magnifi ed by time-to-ship between the origin and the destination country. Table 1 presents our baseline results, based on the estimation of different specifi cations of equation (10). In columns (1) and (2), we replace the country-pair fi xed effects (μ ij ) with directional exporter and importer fi xed effects. In columns (3) to (9), we include bilateral fi xed effects (μ ij ). Additionally, in column (6), we control for importer × year, and in column (7) for both importer × year and exporter × year fi xed effects. 16 The coeffi cients on the standard gravity determinants are signifi cant and of the expected signs. When including country-pair fi xed effect, a banking crisis in the destination country is found to signifi cantly decrease bilateral exports, although the size of the effect is moderate: between -5.8% (exp(-0.06) -1) and -7.7% (exp(-0.08) -1) in columns (3) 
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Banking crisis jt × contiguity (1) and (2), estimates of time-invariant bilateral variables (contiguity, common language, common colonizer, colony, common legal origin) are not reported but available upon request. *** Signifi cant at the 1% level. ** Signifi cant at the 5% level. * Signifi cant at the 10% level.
to (5). Time-to-ship, however, magnifi es the response of trade to banking crises: the interaction term between the banking crisis dummy and bilateral time-to-ship is negative and signifi cant at the 1% level (in columns [2] and [4] to [7] ). To give an order of magnitude, a one standard deviation increase of time-to-ship from the mean magnifi es the effect of a banking crisis on imports from -7 to -10% in column (4). To ensure that our results are not due to the correlation of time-toship with other bilateral characteristics that affect the response of trade to crises, we include in column (5) a number of additional interaction terms between bilateral variables (FTA, common currency, common language, common legal origin, and contiguity) and distance. Some of these interactions are indeed signifi cant: for instance, a crisis in a destination country has a larger negative impact on bilateral trade if the two countries belong to the same trade agreement or currency union. These two effects are interesting and somewhat surprising. They suggest that our results on time-to-ship do not refl ect the impact of fi nancial crises on more fragile trade relations between countries that are both distant and without monetary or trade agreements. The interaction term on time-to-ship is unaffected by these controls.
The amplifi cation effect of time-to-ship is remarkably stable when we include importer × year (column [6]) or both importer × year and exporter × year dummies (column [7] ). In columns (8) and (9) of table 1, we check whether the recent fi nancial crisis has a different effect on trade compared with past crisis episodes. We thus split the banking crisis dummy into two variables: a dummy for the recent crisis, after 2007, and a dummy for previous crises. The recent crisis is found to have reduced trade more strongly (for a given fall in GDP and other controls): -30% (exp (-0.36) -1) for the recent crisis versus -2% (and statistically insignifi cant) for past crisis (column [8] 5] ), or country-pair, importer × year, and exporter × year fi xed effects (column [6]).
Our baseline results are again unaffected: the interaction term between banking crisis in the importer country and time-to-ship is still negative and signifi cant. A banking crisis in the exporter country has a slightly positive or insignifi cant impact on exports depending on the specifi cation, a result consistent with Abiad, Topalova, and Mishra (2011) . However, the interaction term between banking crisis in the exporter country and the time-to-ship is negative (columns [2] and [4] to (1) and (2), estimates of time-invariant bilateral variables (contiguity, common language, common colonizer, colony, common legal origin) are not reported. *** Signifi cant at the 1% level. ** Signifi cant at the 5% level. * Signifi cant at the 10% level.
[6]). This may be interpreted in light of our model if a banking crisis in the exporter country is an indication of funding stress for exporters. In equation (7), note that an increase in the interest rate at which exporters borrow has the same qualitative effect as an increase in the probability of default in the importer country. Both effects on trade are amplifi ed by time-to-ship. A banking crisis is a rough indicator of the diffi culty and cost of borrowing for exporters, but the result is suggestive of the same type of mechanism as the probability of default of importers on which we focus. In table 3, we conduct several robustness tests starting from regression (3) in table 1. So all regressions include country-pair fi xed effects and year dummies. One might argue that our results are driven by an increase in the elasticity of trade to time-to-ship over time. 17 As the number of banking crises increases over time (see fi gure A1 in the appendix), this could bias our results. Our amplifi cation effect of timeto-ship might also capture the fact that crises have become both more frequent and distant over time. In regression (1) in table 3, we include a full set of interactions between year dummies and our crisis variable (to control for their increased frequency) and between year dummies and time-to-ship (to control for its potential increased impact over time). As shown in column (1), the interaction between crises and time-to-ship remains signifi cant at the 1% level.
In regression (2), we replace the measure of time-to-ship that we expanded from Feyrer (2011) by his original measure, which implies the loss of many observations. In regression (3), we use simple distance as an alternative measure for time-to-ship. The effect is similar in both cases. Distance and our measure of time-to-ship are very correlated, but as explained before, differ for certain pairs of countries, in particular contiguous ones. Remember that our theoretical framework generates a radically different role for trade costs, such as distance, and for time-toship. Both distance and time-to-ship, because they increase trade costs, reduce trade fl ows but only time-to-ship raises the elasticity of trade to fi nancial risk. In order to check whether distance per se or time-to-ship is at the source of our main results, we include both interaction terms in regression (4). As predicted by theory, the distance interaction loses its signifi cance but the time-to-ship interaction remains similar in size and very signifi cant. This suggests that time-to-ship and not distance is at the source of our amplifi cation result. In regression (5), we include an interaction term between time-to-ship and the GDP of the destination country. The objective is to check whether the time-to-ship amplifi ca- Table 3 Crises, Time-to-Ship, and Imports: Robustness Dependent Variable Model ln Bilateral exports tion effect comes from a demand effect of the fi nancial crisis that lowers income. We see fi rst that in periods with low GDP, importer countries import relatively more from countries with higher time-to-ship. More importantly, the interaction term between time-to-ship and the banking crisis is not much affected. In regression (6), we use an alternative measure of fi nancial risk in the destination country and replace the banking crisis dummy by a currency crisis dummy (also coming from Reinhart and Rogoff 2011) . We see that the interaction term with time-to-ship exhibits a similar effect. In regression (7), we interact both the banking crisis dummy and the currency crisis with time-to-ship. Estimates are both signifi cant and quantitatively similar. This suggests that other fi nancial risks, such as currency crises, which may also put into danger international payments, have similar effects to banking crisis. Finally, in the last regression, we check whether our time-to-ship measure does not capture the effect of a distance between the fi nancial development of the trade partners that could amplify the impact of the fi nancial crisis on their trade. The time-to-ship interaction term remains very significant in this case. Table A5 in the appendix reports further robustness checks. Timeto-ship may be correlated with importer or exporter characteristics that affect their responses to fi nancial crises. We therefore interact the banking crisis dummy with the economic size (GDP) or the fi nancial development level of the importer or the exporter. We fi nd that a crisis in the importing country has a larger negative effect when the exporter is economically smaller (column [1] ), or when the importer is economically larger (column [2] ) and more fi nancially developed (column [4] ). Moreover, when the exporter is a developing country, a crisis in the importing country has a more negative effect on trade (column [5] ). This is consistent with Berman and Martin (2012) who fi nd that exports of Sub-Saharan African countries are hit harder than average when a crisis occurs in their partner countries. In regression (6), we add interaction terms between regions for the origin country and the banking crisis dummy in destination to check whether our results are due to a specifi c region in the world. We see this is not the case. In that table, it is worth noting that, across specifi cations, the estimate of the interaction between crisis and time-to-ship remains highly signifi cant and remarkably stable.
In fi gure A2 in the appendix, we test whether the effect of banking crises on imports and the magnifi cation effect of time-to-ship builds up through time; that is, if these effects are amplifi ed as the crisis lasts. We start from our baseline specifi cation (table 1, column [4] ), but replace the crisis variable by a set of dummies representing the number of years since the crisis started. More precisely, we split our crisis variable into four dummies that equal 1, respectively, if the importer country is (a) in the fi rst year of the crisis; (b) in the second to fourth year; (c) in the fi fth to the ninth year; or (d) if the crisis started 10 or more years before. We further interact these bins with the (demeaned) time-to-ship variable. Figure A2 , part (a) plots the deviation of bilateral imports during a crisis depending on its duration. The x-axis represents the "natural" trade level as given by the gravity equation, and the fi gure can therefore be interpreted as the deviation from this level. The 90% confi dence intervals are depicted by dotted lines around the estimated effect. Figure  A2 , part (b) represents the magnifi cation effect of time-to-ship. Both the average effect of the crisis and the effect of time-to-ship are found to increase (in absolute value) as the crisis lasts. This can be understood as follows: a crisis destroys imports, which deviate from their natural level; as long as the crisis continues, more trade is destroyed and trade moves further away from its natural level.
Finally, in the appendix, we present further evidence of the amplifi cation effect of time-to-ship on sectoral trade. The negative effect of time-to-ship is observed in various sectors, suggesting that our results are not due to composition effects.
IV. Firm-Level Evidence
Data. We use the fi rm-destination specifi c export data from the French customs over the period 1995 to 2005. This database reports the volume (in tons) and value (in euros) of exports for each product (combined nomenclature) and destination, for each fi rm located on the French metropolitan territory. Unit values are computed as the ratio of export value divided by export volume. These are, therefore, imperfect measures of export prices. Some shipments are excluded from this data collection. Inside the European Union (EU), fi rms are required to report their shipments by product and destination country only if their annual trade value exceeds the threshold of 150,000 euros. For exports outside the EU all fl ows are recorded, unless their value is smaller than 1,000 euros or one ton. Those thresholds only eliminate a very small proportion of total exports. As unit values and export volumes can be noisy, we clean the data by dropping the observations for which the yearly growth rate of one of these variables was in the top or bottom 1% of the distribution, computed by year.
We match this data set with Reinhart and Rogoff's banking crises data in destination countries between 1995 and 2005. Moreover, as we want to estimate variants of the specifi cation (10) for French fi rms exports, we add destination-specifi c variables, such as GDP, real exchange rate, FTA, and common currency (euro) (see Section III, subsection B, for details on the construction of these variables). For time-to-ship, we use the same methodology and source as in the previous section. In this section, we only use time-to-ship between France and the countries it exports to. In a previous version of the paper we also had computed a time-to-ship measure from a different source: we computed the amount of time (in days) required to ship from France's main sea port (Le Havre) to each of the destination countries' main sea ports. The data come from Sea Rates, a sea-freight broker based in Miami, Florida (http:/ /www .searates.com). Sea Rates provides the estimated shipping time, which depends on the actual itinerary of the ship and takes into account the crossing of international canals such as Panama, Suez, and also the Saint Lawrence seaway or the Kiel canal linking the North sea to the Baltic sea. Our results are very similar to those obtained with Feyrer data so we do not report them here. They are available upon request.
Results. We assess the impact of fi nancial crises in the destination countries on the intensive and extensive margins on trade at the fi rm level. We also estimate whether this impact is magnifi ed by shipping time. Table 4 depicts the results on the intensive margin. Columns (1) to (3) report the estimations on unit values, columns (4) to (6) on export volumes, and columns (7) to (9) on export values. Note that similar results are obtained when the log of destination GDP is included in the unit value regressions (columns [1] to [3]), which is not required theoretically. All columns show within estimations since they include fi xed effects at the fi rm-destination level. Year dummies are also added.
Consistent with our theory, French fi rms are found to react to a fi nancial crisis in the destination country by increasing their prices (column [1]), and decreasing their export volumes and values (columns [4] and [6] ). This suggests, therefore, that there is pricing-to-market that responds to the fi nancial condition of the destination country-in this specifi c case, the increased risk that comes with a fi nancial crisis. All these 
(8) Interestingly, when we include both distance and time-to-ship in our estimations (except in column [3] ), only the interaction with time-toship remains signifi cant (despite the very high correlation between the two variables)-at the 5% level in column (6) and at the 10% level in column (9).
The impact of longer time-to-ship on the effect of fi nancial crises is also signifi cant quantitatively. To give an idea of the magnitude of the effect, in column (5) an increase in time-to-ship from 10 to 20 days magnifi es the drop of export volumes during a fi nancial crisis from -1% to -8% (-12% for 30 days of time-to-ship). For export values, the effect is insignifi cant for 10 days but drops to -6% for 20 days, and up to -10% after 30 days (column [8]). Table 5 contains the results on the extensive margin. We estimate the probability that a given fi rm exits from a given destination, and how it depends on the occurrence of banking crises and other destinationspecifi c variables. We either use fi xed effect logit estimations (columns [1] to [3] ) or linear estimations with fi rm-destination fi xed effects (columns [4] to [6] ). Note that as these are within estimations, any fi rmdestination that contains only zeros or ones is not considered. Again, in all estimations year dummies are included. The dependent variable is the probability that a fi rm i does not export to a destination j during year t, conditional on exporting in t -1.
Unsurprisingly, a crisis increases the probability to exit a given destination in the year of the fi nancial crisis. The average effect is, however, quantitatively low: in column (4), the exit probability increases by less than 4 percentage points during crises episodes. This is consistent with Bricongne et al. (2012) who fi nd that during the 2008 to 2009 fi nancial crisis, most of the fall in exports by French fi rms was due to the intensive margin. Note, however, that this effect comes on top of the income drop that itself increases the exit probability. As predicted by theory, the effect of the fi nancial crisis on the exit probability is amplifi ed by higher time-to-ship (columns 
V. Conclusion
This paper has documented a robust stylized fact, and discussed a possible mechanism underlying it. When a country is hit by a fi nancial crisis, its imports decrease more when the time-to-ship to the partner country is higher. It was the case during the recent trade collapse, but also in past crises. At the aggregate level, this result is robust to the inclusion of various controls or to the use of alternative estimators. It is also observed at the sectoral level and at the fi rm level on a large panel of French fi rms over the period 1995 to 2005. The effect of crises in destination countries is magnifi ed at both the intensive (export volumes and values) and the extensive margin (exit probability) levels.
What is the reason behind this magnifi cation effect of time-to-ship? Notes: Standard errors (robust for linear probability model, or LPM, estimations) in parentheses. Pr(Exit ijt > 0) is the probability that a fi rm i does not export to market j during year t, conditional on positive exports in year t -1. Year dummies and fi rm-destination fi xed effects are included in all estimations. *** Signifi cant at the 1% level. ** Signifi cant at the 5% level. * Signifi cant at the 10% level.
We argue that the time-to-ship amplifi cation may be considered as a footprint left by a fi nancial friction specifi c to international trade. The risk associated with longer shipping time is heightened during fi nancial crisis, as is the probability that an importer defaults on his payment obligation increases as time passes. Our model has implications at the fi rm level on exporter prices, quantities, and entry-exit adjustment during fi nancial crises that are broadly consistent with the data. Importantly, time-to-ship in our framework is not only a trade cost, it increases the elasticity of trade to fi nancial risk.
The mechanism that we analyze may have larger implications for how fi nancial frictions and risk both at the aggregate and at the individual level affect trade patterns, especially at the business cycle frequency. 18 In particular, interest rate changes and exchange rate volatility may affect international trade through this mechanism and be amplifi ed by time-to-ship. We leave these theoretical and empirical questions for future research. Table A6 presents the results of the estimates of the interaction term The estimates of the interaction term between the banking crisis dummy and time-to-ship are sorted according to their magnitude. More than half of the estimates are signifi cant and in line with the aggregate point estimates of table 1. The largest amplifi cation effects are found in the divisions 31 (manufacture of food, beverages, and tobacco) and 38 (manufacture of fabricated metal products, machinery, and equipment). In contrast, no amplifi cation effect is found in the division 32 (textile, wearing apparel, and leather industries).
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1. We are not the fi rst to analyze the implications of this characteristic of international trade (see, e.g., Feyrer [2011] for the most recent contributions).
2. Interestingly, in another paper, Levchenko, Lewis, and Tesar (2011) fi nd results that are very much related to ours on the role of shipping time on US trade data during the 2008 to 2009 fi nancial crisis. They fi nd that the fall of US imports (but not exports) during the fi nancial crisis period (Q2:2008 to Q2:2009) was larger for countries with longer time-to-ship. They also fi nd that sectors with higher shares of imports shipped by ocean (relative to air shipping) experienced larger drops.
3. For a general equilibrium model of time-to-ship that analyzes how the variation in the rate at which agents are willing to substitute across time affects how trade volumes respond to changes in income and prices, see Leibovici and Waugh (2011). 4. In reality, the penalty may not be as harsh, except of course in the case of perishable goods. If the goods can be shipped back from the destination the cost of the fi nancial incident will be lower, but our main conclusions will remain qualitatively similar.
5. Some heterogeneity on the dimension of the importers, in particular on their fi nancial health, could be added, but this would not change the results fundamentally.
6. Antras and Foley (2011) use a detailed transaction level data from a US-based exporter of frozen and refrigerated food products, primarily poultry, to describe broad patterns about the use of alternative fi nancing terms. The most commonly used fi nancing terms do not involve direct fi nancial intermediation by banks. They are cash in advance terms and open account terms; these are used for 44.0% and 39.2% of the value of transactions, respectively. Cash in advance terms require the importer to pay before goods are shipped. Open account terms allow a customer to pay a certain amount of time following receipt of the goods.
7. For simplicity, we investigate the effect a marginal increase in q s , which may increase more sharply during a fi nancial crisis.
8. Note that our results are robust to clustering at the country-pair level. 9. See Head, Mayer, and Ries (2010, appendix A) for details on the compilation of trade fl ows from DOTS and other gravity variables. We mostly rely on the same procedures here, with updated data.
10. See http:/ /www.ggdc.net/maddison. 11. See http:/ /www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm.
